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The First Amendment Implications of
Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism
Joseph Grinstein
The obligation of Allah is upon us to wage Jihad for the sake of
Allah. It is one of the obligations which we must undoubtedly
fulfill ... and we conquer the lands of the infidels and we spread
Islam by calling the infidels to Allah and if they stand in our way,
then we wage Jihad for the sake of Allah.
-Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, speaking in Detroit in 1991'
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and
extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement
among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all
men would agree .... Man's relation to his God was made no
concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.
-Justice William 0. Douglas, United States v. Ballard2
In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution,3 the
Supreme Court has established that individuals have an unassailable right to
maintain any religious beliefs they choose.4 Secular tribunals must refrain
from judging the validity of religious beliefs,5 and the state may not interfere
with the internal doctrinal deliberations of religious bodies.6 Perhaps the
I. Jihad in America (WNET television broadcast, Nov. 21, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
2. 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ).
4. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (prohibiting jury from inquiring into validity
of defendants' religious beliefs).
6. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871) (prohibiting courts from
participating in internal church debates over dogma).
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Supreme Court has developed this belief-friendly interpretation of the First
Amendment because religious ideas rarely have imperiled the nation's
existence. While the state occasionally has scrutinized "radical" religions with
unpopular beliefs and practices,7 spiritual groups historically have not
threatened U.S. national security.
The Middle East, however, has not enjoyed such a pleasant state of affairs.
The menace of violent jihad undertaken by adherents of radical Islamic
fundamentalism presently jeopardizes secular governments in that region.9 To
counter this threat, nations such as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia have cracked
down brutally on violent and nonviolent fundamentalists alike, resorting to
military strikes against mosques, detention and trial without due process, and
routine torture of prisoners.'0 Leaders in the region have justified these
actions by insisting that maintaining a liberal respect for human rights is
impossible in societies torn apart by religious violence. As Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak stated defiantly: "'I refuse to allow human rights to become
a slogan to protect terrorists.""'
Ominously, events in the last few years suggest that the threat of violence
posed by radical sects in the Middle East has now arrived in the United States.
The February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center painfully demonstrated
the vulnerability of the United States to terrorists with ties to radical Islamic
groups. In July of that same year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
broke up an extensive terrorist plot inspired by the radical Islamic
fundamentalist teachings of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman,12 a blind Egyptian
7. For example, in the nineteenth century, the federal government considered Mormonism to be a
socially unacceptable religion and acted to suppress some of its practices. See infra note 114.
8. Jihad is the Islamic concept of "struggle." Some radical sects interpret it as "holy war." For these
sects, waging jihad often includes the use of terrorism and violence, whereby the spiritual quest to create
a "universalistic Islamic state" justifies recourse to political warfare. Thus, radical Islamic fundamentalist
terrorists' actions that appear to be politically motivated are really means to the achievement of larger
religious goals. Furthermore, some radical Islamic fundamentalists considerjihad to be a passionate spiritual
quest that knows no end until total victory is achieved. See AMIR TAHERI, HOLY TERROR: INSIDE THE
WORLD OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM 14-18 (1987).
9. Terrorists and those who support them represent a tiny minority within the Islamic community. As
one author has stated:
A comparison could be made with the Inquisition, which, although rooted in a strict reading of
Christianity, did not encompass the much wider universe of Christ's message. The vast majority
of Muslims would probably not see their beliefs, hopes, and aspirations reflected in the action
of suicide bombers in Beirut or the throwing into the sea of a crippled American passenger on
the Achille Lauro.
Id. at I. Therefore, this Note will refer to those who engage in violent acts in the name of Islam as
adherents of "radical Islamic fundamentalism" to distinguish them from the vast majority of the Muslim
community.
10. See, e.g., Andrew Borowiec, Tunisia Still Fears Fundamentalism: Nation Nervously Watches
Algeria, WASH. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at A14; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algeria Is Seen Edging Toward
Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at A7; Kim Murphy, Martyr, Schoolgirl, Soldier, Terrorist: The Battle
for Egypt, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, Magazine, at 28.
11. Stanley Reed, The Battle for Egypt, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 94, 103.
12. English transliterations of Arabic words often vary widely. For the sake of consistency, this Note
will use the spellings employed in the reported pretrial decisions of the Rahman prosecution.
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cleric living in New Jersey. Rahman and nine codefendants were convicted in
federal court on October 1, 1995, for conspiring to wage a "'war of urban
terrorism ' "13 against the United States in the name of jihad 4 On January
17, 1996, Judge Michael Mukasey handed Rahman a life sentence for his role
in the crime. 5
Because of the seriousness of the plot, the Rahman trial is widely
considered to be the most important international-terrorism prosecution ever
conducted in the United States.' 6 The case is perhaps most noteworthy,
however, for the manner in which the federal government responded to the
conspiracy-by charging each defendant with sedition. The government
accused Rahman of inciting his followers to wage religious warfare, and, as
evidence of this incitement, it presented to the jury recordings of the Sheik's
fervent sermons. Needless to say, for the government to dust off its sedition
laws and employ them against a cleric raises disturbing questions about the
scope of religious freedom in the United States. Such prosecutorial tactics
probably were justified in the Rahman case, given the grave nature of the plot
that the FBI exposed. In less dramatic instances of "subversive" preaching,
however, the use of a sedition charge may impair religious freedom more than
it protects national security.
The arrival of religiously motivated terrorism in the United States poses
the question of whether the free exercise rights guaranteed by the Constitution
can withstand the challenge of spiritual doctrines that threaten the nation's
security. This Note argues that the Supreme Court's limited definition of
religious belief-rooted in individualism, not communitarianism' 7-- gives the
government the latitude to employ sedition laws to censor the sermons of both
peaceful and violent religious leaders. By regulating the content of religious
teachings in such a manner, the government essentially can outlaw certain
beliefs. Unfortunately, secular courts cannot police this broad governmental
power effectively since they are ill-equipped to distinguish between those
religious doctrines that endanger national security and those that do not.
Therefore, to ensure that the state criminalizes only those religious beliefs that
truly threaten the nation, this Note proposes that a religious exception should
be added to the "clear and present danger" test, the Court's present seditious-
speech standard. Before the state can suppress "subversive" religious speech
under the test, it should be forced to prove that the speech reasonably led to
13. United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254,259 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (pretrial order) (quoting Rahman
Indictment 9).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
15. Joseph P. Fried, Sheik Draws Life in Plot to Bomb Public Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996,
at AI.
16. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson, Terror Plot Trial Opens for Sheik, Eleven Followers, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1995, at A20.
17. This Note uses the word "communitarianism" to refer to activities that are group oriented.
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overt acts committed against the government.'8 Only by carving out such a
protection for belief can the United States hope to avoid the Middle Eastern
approach of gutting spiritual freedom in an attempt to protect society from
"dangerous" faiths.
To place these issues in their proper context, Part I of this Note discusses
the Rahman case as a model for future religiously motivated terrorism
prosecutions. Part II identifies the constitutional right implicated in religious
sedition prosecutions by describing the special position of spiritual belief in the
Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Part I presents the problem
posed by the application of the Supreme Court's individualistic definition of
spiritual belief to religiously motivated terrorism prosecutions: Disturbingly,
the definition allows the state to attack constitutionally sacred beliefs by
regulating group spiritual expression through the "clear and present danger"
standard. Given that practical considerations-most importantly the danger of
terrorism itself-require that the definition remain unchanged, Part IV proposes
a "backdoor" solution to the problem that avoids a redefinition of belief by
instead altering the "clear and present danger" test to include an overt act
requirement.
I. RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES
The Rahman case exemplifies the uncomfortable interplay between
religious freedom and national security. The prosecution of Sheik Rahman for
the content of both his sermons and his religious advice demonstrates how in
religiously motivated terrorism cases the government can potentially infringe
upon spiritual liberties by labeling religious speech as "seditious." The Rahman
case may illustrate the prosecutorial tool-the use of sedition charges-that the
government will employ in subsequent terrorism trials.
While the United States has witnessed isolated incidents of religious
violence in the past, organized, doctrinally driven terrorism targeted at innocent
bystanders currently threatens the nation. The 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center by a group of terrorists with loose ties to Sheik Rahman's
mosque'9 provides the most spectacular and, to date, most deadly example of
this phenomenon. In 1994, four defendants were each sentenced to 240 years
18. This Note raises general concerns about the constitutional implications of religious sedition
charges. It does not find fault with the result of the Rahman case, however. Specifically, the overt act
proposal in this Note would constrain the government in a case against a more questionably "dangerous"
preacher than the Sheik, but it would not have affected the outcome of the Rahman case.
19. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Mountains of Evidence Leave Some Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2.
1995, at B5 (noting Trade Center bombers had weak ties to Sheik Rahman). Although both the Rahman
plot and the World Trade Center bombing involved defendants from the same religious circles, the two
trials were separate affairs.
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in prison for their roles in the bombing, which resulted in six deaths.2" During
the trial, however, the government chose not to delve very deeply into the
religious beliefs that may have motivated the bombing.
By contrast, the radical Islamic fundamentalist ideologies of the defendants
permeated the recent terrorism trial of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and nine
coconspirators. The group was convicted of participating in an extensive plot
"'to levy a war of urban terrorism against the United States, to oppose by force
the authority of the United States, and by force to prevent, hinder and delay
the execution of laws of the United States."''2 Inspired by Rahman's fiery
sermonizing, members of the group assassinated a radical anti-Arab rabbi, Meir
Kahane, in November 199022 and plotted to blow up the United Nations and
New York federal buildings, destroy the Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New
York City, and kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was on an
official visit to the United States.23 Law enforcement authorities arrested most
of the defendants (but not Rahman himself) in a garage in Queens, New York,
on June 24, 1993, while they were mixing explosives for an enormous bomb
to be used in the scheme.
24
The distinguishing feature of the Rahman case was the unusual charge
employed by the government against each defendant-seditious conspiracy.
5
The seditious conspiracy statute, a rarely used criminal provision that
originates from a Civil War law aimed at secessionists, allows defendants to
be convicted simply for concocting general plots against the government, thus
relieving the prosecution of any need to prove specific subversive acts.26 As
one commentator has noted, "'Essentially seditious conspiracy deals with a
crime of the mind,' . .. '[I]t allows a conviction based on a sense that there
is antipathy or hatred. You don't have to do anything; you just have to think
20. Richard Bernstein, Trade Center Bombers Get Prison Terms of 240 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1994, at Al.
21. United States v. Rahman, 854 F Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (pretrial order) (quoting Rahman
Indictment 9).
22. One of the defendants in the Rahman case, El Sayyid A. Nosair, stood trial for this assassination
in state court and was convicted only on weapons charges. He was then convicted for the murder in the
federal Rahman case. Joseph P. Fried, Bomb Trial Ends: Jury Finds Men Planned Four-Year Campaign
of Urban Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at Al.
23. Eleanor Randolph, "Megatrial" Prompts Questions of Fairness, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at
A25.
24. Robert D. McFadden, Eight Seized as Suspects in Plot to Bomb New York Targets and Kill
Political Figures, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1993, at Al.
25. The seditious conspiracy statute provides:
If two or more persons... conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the
Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the
authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United
States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the
authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2384 OVest Supp. 1995).
Rahman was convicted under the 1988 version of the seditious conspiracy statute quoted above.
26. Seth Faison, Prosecutors Pick a Law From Past, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at B5.
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it."'27 Although modern-day sedition trials are almost unheard of,2 the
breadth and severity of the seditious conspiracy statute make it a logical tool
for future religiously motivated terrorism prosecutions."
As its name implies, the seditious conspiracy law is technically a
conspiracy statute and thus contemplates some type of criminal agreement. 30
In Rahman's case, however, prosecutors interpreted the agreement requirement
rather loosely, as they charged the Sheik with inciting his followers to
undertake subversive actions rather than making specific terrorist plans with
them. Rahman did not participate in either the actual plotting against the
government or the preparatory activities undertaken by his fellow
defendants.3' Instead, he was convicted for providing religious encouragement
to his coconspirators, both in a general sense and about the shape of their
specific plans.32 As Andrew McCarthy, one of the federal prosecutors on the
case, stated: "'There is a difference between being the engineer of a specific
act and someone who is the spiritual and ideological leader of the
conspiracy,' . . . 'What the evidence I think sensibly shows is that there is an
27. Kevin Fedarko, The Imaginary Apocalypse: A U.S. Court Finds a Blind Muslim Cleric and Nine
of His Followers Guilty of "Seditious Conspiracy" to Conduct a Bombing Spree Throughout New York
City, TIME (int'l ed.), Oct. 16, 1995, at 46, 46 (quoting Fordham University Law Professor Tracy Higgins).
28. Commenting on the Rahman case, the American Bar Association Journal noted: "Charging a
defendant with sedition in the modem-day United States might seem as archaic as making him walk the
plank." Jeff Barge, Sedition Prosecutions Rarely Successful, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 16, 16.
29. See Faison, supra note 26, at B5 (noting that law enables prosecutors to "cast a wider legal net");
Richard Prez-Pefia, A Gamble Pays Off as the Prosecution Uses an Obscure 19th-Century Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at B5 (noting prosecutors feel seditious conspiracy statute provides them with several
advantages in attacking terrorism).
30. See PAUL MARCUS, PROSECUrION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 2.02 (1995)
(noting that proof of agreement is essential to conspiracy).
31. The taped evidence revealed that at one point Rahman's actions almost amounted to the specific
formulation of a plot. When asked by a conspirator if an attack on the United Nations building would be
"'licit or illicit,"' Rahman responded that it would be "'licit"' but "'bad for Muslims."' He suggested that
the plotters instead "'inflict damage on the American Army itself."' Joseph P. Fried, Sheik and Nine
Followers Guilty of a Conspiracy of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at Al, B4. Characteristically,
however, Rahman carefully framed the question as one involving an interpretation of Islamic law.
32. The federal seditious advocacy statute, which criminalizes advocating the violent overthrow of the
government, is relevant to this type of criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (West Supp. 1995)
("Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States... [s]hall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years .... ).
In Rahman's case, the seditious conspiracy statute operated as a charge of seditious advocacy,
convicting him for advocating violence and inciting his followers rather than reaching specific criminal
agreements with them. See Prez-Pefia, supra note 29, at B5 (noting government saw seditious conspiracy
charge as means of prosecuting Rahman even though he could not be tied to any specific criminal acts and
did nothing more than talk about plot). Using the same evidence, prosecutors might have been able to
charge Rahman under the federal seditious advocacy statute, except that the plot in which Rahman was
involved was aimed more at "levying a war"--one of the targets of the seditious conspiracy statute--than
at "overthrowing the government"-the target of the seditious advocacy law. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2384
(1988), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2384 (West Supp. 1995) (referring to "levying war") with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (West Supp. 1995) (referring to "overthrowing the
government").
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organization for terrorism in the United States. It's [sic] designer is the
sheik."' 3
3
On its face, the Rahman case may raise no difficult constitutional questions
not already settled by the Supreme Court's rulings on the general legality of
sedition statutes.' A closer examination of the evidence presented during the
trial, however, reveals how terrorism prosecutions like Rahman's can implicate
spiritual freedom by criminalizing the content of religious speech. To prove the
seditious conspiracy charge against Rahman, the government showed the jury
a videotape of one of the Sheik's fiery sermons in which he urged Muslims to
wage war against all of Islam's enemies, including the United States. The tape
portrayed Rahman arguing, "'Jihad is fighting the enemy, fighting the enemies
for God's sake."' 35 Another tape introduced by the prosecution portrayed
Rahman exhorting his followers, "'The Koran makes [terrorism] among the
means to perform jihad in [sic] the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the
enemies of God [who are] our enemies too .... We must be terrorists and
must terrorize the enemies of Islam and frighten them and ... disturb
them."' 36 Additionally, the government argued that Rahman not only
encouraged his congregants to wage fihad against the United States, but also
gave them religious advice about their specific criminal plans by stating which
schemes would be in accord with Islam.37 Although the evidence sometimes
seemed to blur the distinction between Rahman's religious and political views,
given the frequent overlap between the two inherent in jihad,38 Rahman's
radical view of Islamic fundamentalism must have motivated his actions. Thus,
Rahman was prosecuted essentially because of the content of his sermons and
his religious advice. Indeed, the religious nature of the evidence presented
against Rahman led one of his attorneys to argue that the federal government,
terrified by the arrival of radical Islam in the United States, prosecuted
Rahman to suppress his religious views. As Rahman's attorney asserted,
"'[T]his is clearly religious speech, nothing more-he violated no law,' ...
'The only reason he's on trial is because it's a Muslim who's saying this.' 39
While the Rahman case itself raises several interesting questions about
religious freedom, it is most useful as a prototype for future religiously
motivated terrorism prosecutions. Trials like Rahman's are likely to occur with
33. McKinley, supra note 19, at B5.
34. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502-08 (1951) (arguing that speech may not be
protected by First Amendment if it creates danger to nation); STEPHEN M. KOHN, AMERICAN POLITICAL
PRISONERS 22 (1994) (noting that gedition laws still remain in force).
35. James C. McKinley, Jr., Sheik's Talk at Issue in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at B2.
36. Gail Appleson, Sheik Heard Endorsing Terrorism Against Foes, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1995,
at 25.
37. Eleanor Randolph, "Jihad" Plot Defendants Facing Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at A14.
38. See supra note S.
39. Nadia Abou el-Magd & David Kocieniewski, Sheik Urged "City Battles," NWVSDAY (New York),
Mar. 1, 1995, at A21 (quoting attorney Abdeen Jabara's reference to Rahman's speeches read by
prosecution to jurors).
19961 1353
The Yale Law Journal
increasing frequency in the United States. With the end of the Cold War and
the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, U.S. officials
now consider terrorism to be a top national security concern. 4° The recent,
controversial public television documentary, Jihad in America, chronicled an
alleged network of radical Islamic fundamentalist groups in the United States
bent on waging religious warfare."a Most disturbing of the program's images
was footage purportedly taken at a radical Islamic summer camp in the
Midwest where young children are taught how to wage violent jihad in the
United States.42 If such claims are true, then the Rahman prosecution will
likely be the beginning, rather than the end, of America's domestic
confrontation with radical Islamic fundamentalist violence.
Moreover, religious violence is by no means confined to radical Islamic
sects. The issues raised by the Rahman case could just as easily resurface next
in the context of Christian, rather than Islamic, fundamentalism. Substitute the
words "Jesus Christ" for "Allah" and "abortionists" for "infidels" in Sheik
Rahman's sermons, and the danger posed by radical fundamentalism of a
different stripe becomes evident. In recent years, members of radical Christian
groups have violently expressed their religious opposition to abortion through
attacks on women's clinics and the murder of health care workers.43 Jewish
Zionist organizations," Native American groups, 45 and a host of other
spiritual bodies conceivably could join the fray in the name of their faiths and
thereby subject their leaders to possible sedition charges. While the Rahman
case provides a dramatic example of governmental criminalization of religious
sermons, concern for the prosecutorial tactics employed in the case should not
be confined to the narrow realm of radical Islamic fundamentalism.
40. See, e.g., Ron Martz, Experts See New Trends in Terrorism, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 5, 1994,
at A8 (quoting FBI counterterrorism expert Oliver Revell: "'Islamic fundamentalists, without question, are
one of the greatest threats to the United States .... '); Pierre Thomas and Thomas W. Lippman, U.S.
Plans New Ways to Fight Terrorism, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1993, at 31 (arguing that, as sole remaining
superpower, United States now faces increased threat of terrorism).
41. See Jihad in America, supra note 1. The U.S. Islamic community has heavily criticized this
documentary for presenting a biased picture of Muslims in the United States. For commentary on the
program, see Jihad in America, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A24.
42. See Jihad in America, supra note I. Of course, these groups do not represent the peaceful and law-
abiding mainstream Islamic community in the United States.
43. See Colleen O'Connor, Abortion Clinics Face Increase in Violence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan.
30, 1994, at IA (noting influence of Christian fundamentalism on rising abortion-clinic violence).
44. See Alison Mitchell, Citing Increased Bias and Crime. Jewish Militant Groups Live, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1992, at BI (describing rise of Jewish militant groups in United States). Jewish militants have their
own "summer camps" for teaching young boys military skills. See Joe Sexton, Assassination of Rabin
Raises Alarm Over Role of Kahane's Violent Followers in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1995, at A10.
45. See, e.g., PETER MATrHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 39-40 (1991) (describing spiritual
roots of American Indian Movement, radical Native American organization that had violent confrontations
with federal government in 1970s).
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II. THE HALLOWED CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Religiously motivated terrorism trials therefore threaten to become oft-
repeated battles over the danger posed by particular spiritual doctrines. To
understand the serious ways in which these prosecutions can affect religious
freedom, the unique position of spiritual belief in the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence must first be examined. The special status of
belief under the Court's primary free exercise test-the belief/conduct
paradigm-and the distinctions the Court has drawn between religious and
secular thought both demonstrate the premium accorded religious belief.
A. The Special Status of Religious Belief Under the Belief/Conduct Paradigm
The notion that religious belief and religious conduct are distinguishable
pervades the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Although
the state may regulate religious conduct, religious belief enjoys total protection
from governmental intrusion:
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot
be restricted by law ... Thus the [First] Amendment embraces two
concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.46
The Supreme Court first articulated the belief/conduct distinction over a
century ago in a case upholding a Mormon's polygamy conviction, Reynolds
v. United States.47 Since then, the Court has consistently stood by its position
that the state absolutely may not intrude upon the sacred realm of religious
consciousness. 48 Accordingly, the Court has declined to examine the merits
or veracity of particular religious beliefs.49 At least according to the Court's
46. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
47. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.").
48. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) ("This Court has long held
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be an absolute prohibition against governmental
regulation of religious beliefs .... ); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("The Free Exercise
Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as
such."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.").
49. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981):
The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often than not a difficult
and delicate task .... However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial
perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.
See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.").
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rhetoric, religious belief holds an inviolable position in the U.S. constitutional
system.
Yet while language touting the inviolability of religious belief permeates
the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, the Court rarely invalidates
governmental actions for infringing upon religious belief. One commentator
has argued that in the last century, the Court has negated state actions
explicitly on "belief' grounds in only four instances.5 In general, it seldom
relies on the absolute sanctity of religious belief to resolve free exercise
questions.
Instead, the Supreme Court usually classifies an activity brought before it
as "conduct" rather than "belief."'', Prior to 1990, the Court used a rather
exacting standard to determine the legality of public regulations affecting
religion, requiring that a regulation constitute the "least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest" in order to justify interference with
spiritual conduct.52 In practice, however, the Court granted greater deference
to the government when analyzing regulations of religious conduct than it did
when assessing other types of regulations also governed by "compelling state
interest" tests, such as race-based classifications. 3 For example, the
government successfully claimed that its interests were sufficient to prevent
military personnel from wearing religious headgear while on duty;54 to
penalize a university for racially discriminatory admissions processes inspired
by its religious doctrine;55 to force a group of Native Americans to obtain
Social Security numbers despite the dictates of their spiritual beliefs;56 and
to maintain a system of Sunday blue laws, regardless of their adverse effects
on Sabbatarians.57 Nonetheless, before 1990, the Court employed at least
some level of heightened scrutiny of state activity affecting religious conduct.
In so doing, it allowed Amish children to leave school before completing the
50. Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713,
728-31 (1993). The four cases are Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down conviction of
Jehovah's Witnesses for refusing to carry New Hampshire's slogan, "Live Free or Die," on their
automobiles' license plates); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating Maryland statute
requiring political candidates to declare belief in God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
(prohibiting jury instruction requiring jurors to assess validity of defendants' religious views); and West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (annulling statute mandating salute of flag
in schools because of objections of Jehovah's Witnesses).
51. See, e.g., McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-29 (invalidating state prohibition against ministers' serving
as elected officials as an impermissible regulation of religious conduct, but explicitly refusing to do so on
grounds that prohibition hampered religious belief).
52. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
53. See Michael NV. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1127 (1990) (noting disparity and claiming that "[tihe 'compelling interest' standard is a
misnomer").
54. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
55. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
56. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
57. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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otherwise compulsory number of years of schooling,8 permitted ministers to
serve as elected officials despite a state constitutional provision disqualifying
them from such positions,59  and prohibited a state from denying
unemployment compensation to an individual fired for refusing to work on her
Sabbath.6
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court abandoned the free exercise
"compelling state interest" test in a heavily criticized opinion,6' Employment
Division v. Smith.62 Holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt the
religious use of peyote from state criminal drug laws, the Court maintained
that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).' '63 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, distinguished the
previous "compelling state interest" cases by arguing that they were hybrid
situations that also involved other constitutionally protected interests.' Under
this newer, more deferential standard of review, the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence has focused primarily upon the intentionally discriminatory
application of laws that facially do not single out religious sects for adverse
treatment. 65 Importantly, however, despite making religious conduct more
prone to state regulation, the Smith Court continued to assert in dicta the
absolute sanctity of religious belief '"The free exercise of religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all 'governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such.' ' 66
The belief/conduct distinction therefore reflects the Court's strong
rhetorical concern for religious belief. Despite recently relaxing the constraints
upon governmental regulation of religious conduct, the Court has not strayed
from its firm standard exempting religious belief from all state encroachment.
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
61. See McConnell, supra note 53, at 1111 (describing petition for rehearing "joined by an unusually
broad-based coalition of religious and civil liberties groups from right to left and over a hundred
constitutional law scholars").
62. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
63. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
64. Id. at 881. Scalia distinguished Yoder, for example, by arguing that the case involved both free
exercise rights and parents' rights "to direct the education of their children." Id.
65. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (invalidating
facially neutral ordinance administered so as to prohibit ritual animal sacrifice by Santeria religion).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)); see also Lukumi,
113 S. Ct. at 2227 ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible .... ).
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B. The Different Treatment of Religious and Secular Beliefs
Although the belief/conduct paradigm confers special protection upon
religious belief, the unique status of religious thought becomes most apparent
when contrasted with the law's treatment of secular belief. The Supreme Court
has characterized spiritual beliefs as mysterious. Not viewing secular beliefs
in a similar manner, however, the Court has refused to extend to secular belief
the same exceptional privileges that it has granted to religious views.
Exemptions from state regulations that the Court has granted on account
of religious belief demonstrate the unique nature of spiritualism in its
jurisprudence. In Sherbert v. Verner,67 Wisconsin v. Yoder,68 and Wooley v.
Maynard,69 the Court excused citizens from complying with facially neutral
state laws that infringed upon their religious beliefs. The Court most likely
would not have been so accommodating to merely political viewpoints.70 For
example, the Supreme Court has not allowed a state to prohibit ministers from
serving as elected officials but has permitted the government to exclude
Communists from leadership positions in labor unions.7'
The Supreme Court has based much of this deference to religious belief
on the assumption that courts are not competent to weigh the relative merits
of spiritual claims, which may be tested only in the realm of the individual
soul.72 Because the state cannot judge the validity of the internal deliberations
that relate an individual to her maker, the government must confine its review
of ideas to public affairs.73 On the other hand, society is more competent to
judge purely secular claims through its deliberative processes. Secular thoughts,
in contrast to religious beliefs, exist in the "marketplace" of ideas where they
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (forbidding denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh Day-Adventist
discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath).
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish children to leave school after eighth grade because of
parents' religious beliefs).
69. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (permitting Jehovah's witnesses to refuse to display state slogan, "Live Free
or Die," on license plates because slogan contradicted their moral, political, and religious beliefs).
70. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,717 (1986); see also Gabriel
Moens, The Action-Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion, 12 SYDNEY L. REv. 195, 209 (1989) ("[I]f
the [successful] claims of the Amish defendants [in Yoder] had been based only on philosophical and
personal rather than religious rejection of contemporary secular values ... these claims would have to yield
to the exigencies of ordered liberty."). Although these exemptions occurred in cases involving conduct
motivated by belief, rather than pure belief itself, the discrepancy between the Court's treatment of
religiously inspired actions and politically motivated actions nevertheless highlights the special status of
religious belief.
71. Compare McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating prohibition on ministers) with
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding prohibition on Communists).
72. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are
as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others."); infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
73. See A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 479, 490 (1968) ("Government officials have no special competence to judge the beliefs of other
men which relate them to their fellow men and the universe, and which help them distinguish right from
wrong.... The competence of government, according to the Constitution, is with public affairs.").
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compete for acceptance.74 The secular marketplace functions not only to
promote discussion about public affairs, 75 but also to eliminate false ideas.76
Accordingly, when necessary for society, the state may enter the marketplace
to establish and defend general secular standards of conduct. 77 Public policy
dictates that while religious beliefs may be internal and unquestionable, secular
ideas must be open, testable, and, in rare circumstances, proscribable. As a
result, the Court has explicitly refused to confer upon secular thought the
inviolability of religious belief.78
Hence, both the belief/conduct paradigm and the contrast between religious
and secular thought confirm the special status of spiritual belief. As the Court
has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is sacred and
inviolable, strictly protected from the meddling of the state. How the Court
actually has defined belief, however, profoundly limits the potential reach of
this rule.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM: THE SUPREME COURT'S INFLEXIBLE
DEFINITION OF BELIEF HAMPERS GROUP RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS
Although the absolute protection of religious belief forms the professed
nucleus of the Supreme Court's religious freedom jurisprudence, the way that
the Court has defined "belief' creates a problem for spiritual groups.
Individualism provides the basis for the Court's conception of protected belief.
According to the Court, those ideas that reside solely within the individual
mind constitute "belief." This definition of belief, however, excludes group and
associational activities, such as worship, that are critical to the existence of
religious thought. As a result, the government can regulate these activities
without running afoul of the absolutism of the belief/conduct paradigm.
Unfortunately, by censoring the content of worship, the government can
effectively eradicate certain religious beliefs. While this interpretation of belief
therefore poses serious problems for religious groups, expanding the Court's
restrictive definition to include both a communitarian and individualist
orientation could prove disastrous from a practical standpoint. To alter the
74. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (arguing that debate on secular ideas needs
to be open and vigorous); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (noting that
unacceptable secular ideas should be ferreted out by marketplace).
75. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (arguing "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942) (identifying
"principal bases of democracy" as "knowledge and discussion").
76. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 396 ("Speech may be fought with speech. Falsehoods and fallacies must
be exposed .... ).
77. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 50, at 766-67; Moens, supra note 70, at 210.
78. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 409-10 (rejecting creation of secular First Amendment "fetish of beliefs").
This disparity may originate from the intent of the framers of the First Amendment to single out religious
thought for special protection as a check against the rampant secular authority of the state. See Harrop A.
Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 808-13 (1958).
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definition in that way might lead to rampant religious exemptions from
important governmental regulations. Religious groups are thus placed in a
predicament: The Court's definition of belief subjects their doctrines and tenets
to governmental regulation, but courts most likely would resist any efforts to
change that definition.
A. The Court's Strictly Individualist Interpretation of Religious Belief
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "belief," whether secular or
religious, focuses on its purely internal, personal nature.79 The Court views
belief as lacking any external or expressive character; rather, belief leads a
lonely existence within the confines of the individual mind.80 Thus, the state
offends the sanctity of belief only when it "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment... to reserve from all
official control."8' For example, in recognizing draftees' personal, spiritual
opposition to war, the Court's conscientious-objector cases epitomize its
understanding of religion as a function of the personal beliefs of individuals,
devoid of any institutional or communal character.82 According to the Court,
belief is lodged in congregants, not congregations.
This individualistic definition of belief drastically limits the range of
governmental activities subject to review under the belief prong of the
belief/conduct paradigm. In some very rare instances, the government has
impermissibly invaded the internal realm of belief by forcing citizens to
express opinions in opposition to their religious convictions.83 But in general,
as noted by Professor Laurence Tribe, the only way that the state conceivably
could assault the private domain of religious belief would be through
"government-mandated or state-immunized brainwashing." 84
The Court's conception of belief therefore excludes fundamental yet
external aspects of religious consciousness, such as worship, sermons, and
proselytizing. The Court places regulation of these activities on the conduct
side of the belief/conduct divide, since such activities lack internal and
79. See Hamilton, supra note 50, at 763 ("[W]ithin the solitary spaces of the inner soul there is
freedom.").
80. See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477,495-96
(1991).
81. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
82. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (emphasizing "individual
conscientious belief, not ... sectarian affiliation"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970)
(determining religious nature of belief by significance to individual, rather than by institutional standard);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining religious belief as individual relationship with
higher "power or being").
83. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (prohibiting state from forcing citizen to
express "Live Free or Die"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (forbidding state from compelling
public officials to declare belief in God); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 (prohibiting state from requiring
Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren to salute flag).
84. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv § 14-6, at 1184 (2d ed. 1988).
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individualistic characteristics. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent, a case
brought by a Christian student organization challenging its exclusion from
public-university facilities, the Court expressly classified religious worship as
plain speech-in other words, conduct-subject only to the First Amendment
protections granted to secular expression. 5 While Widmar is the most explicit
example of this technique, the analysis of worship under simple free speech
tests dates back to the Jehovah's Witness cases of the 1940s,86 in which the
Court essentially ignored the free exercise interests implicated by the
Witnesses' public activities and scrutinized them instead under the general
rubric of the First Amendment.8 7 Because worship is treated as expressive
conduct rather than absolutely protected belief, the Court's free expression
jurisprudence allows the state to regulate its content and the time, place, and
manner of its utterance.
B. The Problems Raised by Excluding the Communitarian Nature of
Religious Consciousness from the Court's Definition of Belief
The Supreme Court's individualistic interpretation of belief closely relates
to its larger constitutional vision. The Court's definition reflects its general
embrace of modem, "liberal" political theory, which emphasizes the protection
of individual liberty and property. 8  Proponents of the liberal tradition seek
the creation of strong central governments and regard religious institutions as
a potential threat to the state's authority.89 Thus, liberalism strives to confine
religious liberties to the realm of individual consciousness, where they would
have less influence on the public sphere.9
Liberty's roots, however, extend beyond the simple liberal notion of
individualism. The theory of "civic republicanism," which involves
safeguarding those institutions and aspects of communal life that advance the
public good, competes with the liberal political tradition.91  Civic
85. 454 U.S. 263,269 (1981); see also William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 560 (1983) ("[T]he Court implied that the religious aspects
of the litigant's speech in Widmar would be constitutionally irrelevant to the litigant's claim. After Widmar,
religious speech is speech-no more, no less.").
86. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (protecting free expression aspect of
door-to-door religious solicitation); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (permitting ban on
unlicensed religious parade as valid time, place, and manner restriction).
87. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 714; see also Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1961) (applying this analysis specifically to Cox case).
88. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 730-35. For a fuller discussion of the influence of liberal thought
upon American institutions, see generally Louis HART, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
89. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise. 67 TUL. L. REV.
87, 125-26 (1992).
90. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 731-32.
91. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1695 (1989) (analyzing republican theory); Tushnet, supra note 70, at 735-38 (describing tradition
of civic republicanism). For a discussion comparing the liberal and republican traditions, see MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-17 (1988).
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republicanism considers groups and communities, not just individuals, to be the
linchpins of a free society. According to the republican tradition, liberty and
freedom strengthen intermediary institutions, entities that promote the public
good independent of the state.
Although today the Court focuses on liberal definitions of rights, the
Framers apparently envisioned a political system in which liberalism and
republicanism would act in tandem to protect both individuals and groups.92
As Professor Akhil Amar has suggested, the Bill of Rights originally was not
envisioned as a purely liberal, individualistic text:
Of course, individual and minority rights did constitute a motif of the
Bill of Rights-but not the sole, or even dominant, motif. A close
look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with
language of rights; states' rights and majority rights alongside
individual and minority rights; and protection of various intermediate
associations-church, militia, and jury--designed to create an
educated and virtuous electorate. The main thrust of the Bill was not
to downplay organizational structure, but to deploy it; not to impede
popular majorities, but to empower them."
Unfortunately, because liberalism subsequently achieved a preferred
jurisprudential status, the Court has largely disregarded the original
combination of liberal and republican influences upon constitutional values.94
It now defines most rights, religious or otherwise, in individual terms.
Religious freedom, however, is perhaps the one value in which an
acknowledgment of the republican/communitarian basis of liberty is most
essential. Religion often includes both individuality and collectivity at its
core.95 While some form of purely "individual religious consciousness" is
conceptually possible, spirituality is frequently more vibrant when experienced
in a group setting.96 Religion does not have to be either a purely
individualistic or a purely collective endeavor; rather, as reflected in the
Framers' general constitutional vision, it can be a combination of both. In fact,
some commentators have argued that the Free Exercise Clause was created
specifically to safeguard the associational nature of religion and thereby to
92. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 89, at 93; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988).
93. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991).
94. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 730.
95. See Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001,
1008-09 (1983).
96. See Hall, supra note 89, at 133. Although individualism may be the hallmark of some faiths,
particularly Protestant ones, it certainly is not a universal value. Many other Christian groups, for example,
place communality above individualism. See 2 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 993-1013 (Olive Wyon trans., MacMillan Co. 1931) (1931) (surveying differences
in values among Christian groups).
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ensure the presence of a power structure to compete with the state's
authority.97
Aside from reasons of original intent, associational and institutional aspects
of religious thought also belong in a definition of belief for several practical
reasons. First, the centrality of worship to many religions justifies some form
of communitarian understanding of spiritualism, since worship frequently
requires social interaction.98 While worship may at first glance resemble
conduct more than belief, upon closer examination the resemblance does not
appear to be so clear. For many creeds, the faith must be witnessed and
expressed in word and deed, necessitating interaction with the community.99
In such religions, belief resides in the collective consciousness of the faithful,
not alone in their individual minds. Hence, to protect individual thoughts but
not group expression leaves these beliefs without effective protection.
Second, certain religions have developed complex spiritual theories over
thousands of years. Such beliefs might not continue to exist if adherents could
not disseminate them freely to the next generation. Complex religious doctrines
cannot be expected to spring forth spontaneously in individuals' minds.
Moreover, religions often require counseling and instruction to help the faithful
understand particularly abstract doctrines. Absent such group discussion,
doctrines could be mangled by misunderstanding. Thus, if a religious doctrine
cannot be disseminated and discussed freely by the group that developed it, it
might cease to exist.
Finally, congregants themselves often do not think of churches as
aggregations of individual beliefs. Often no majoritarianism or democracy with
respect to ultimate questions of faith exists within a religious group. Rather,
adherents of particular creeds regard churches as moral units in and of
themselves.' Church members frequently band together initially because
they prefer group to individual consciousness. Interpreting spirituality as
inherently individualistic therefore denies the wishes of many of the very
people that the Free Exercise Clause was designed to protect.'0 '
Hence, discounting the group-oriented aspects of religious belief risks
depriving faith of a characteristic at least as vital to its existence as
individualism.'0 2 Of course, the solution to this deficiency is not to exclude
individualism from the definition of belief. Rather, if the Court wishes to
97. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 567, 588 (1990); see also Joseph M. Dodge II, The Free Exercise of Religion: A
Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv. 679, 726-27 (1969).
98. See 2 TROELTSCH, supra note 96, at 1006-07; Dodge, supra note 97, at 697-98.
99. See PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 22-23 (1964).
100. See Garvey, supra note 97, at 581-82.
101. See id. at 588.
102. See Dodge, supra note 97, at 725-28. At times, the Court inadvertently has recognized the group-
oriented nature of belief: "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)
(emphasis added).
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protect religion, as religion, republican principles would have to be recognized
and included in its free exercise jurisprudence. 0 3 Liberal, individualistic
notions of religious rights alone cannot protect the integral communitarian
aspects of religious belief.'04
C. The Danger Posed to Group Religious Beliefs by the Court's Purely
Individualistic Definition of Belief
The Supreme Court's notion that the government only infringes upon
religious "belief' when it invades the domain of the individual mind ignores
evidence that the existence of religious belief often depends upon the
associational and expressive practices of groups. State actions that effectively
proscribe religious worship or counseling can therefore suppress certain group
beliefs. Prosecutions of religiously motivated terrorism, which may employ
content-based standards such as the "clear and present danger" test to censor
"subversive" religious speech, illustrate this hazard. While historically the
government has refrained from regulating spiritual beliefs, the threat of
terrorism may inspire it to start taking a more aggressive stance toward
"radical" faiths-a move that could have dramatic consequences for the
sanctity of belief but that would not run afoul of current free exercise
jurisprudence.
1. The "Clear and Present Danger" Test as a Regulator of
Religious Thought
Aside from regulating the time, place, and manner of religious speech, the
main way the government can regulate worship is through laws aimed at its
content. By labeling specific ideas uttered by clerics as "dangerous," the state
can employ content-based standards to "outlaw" certain religious beliefs.
According to Widmar v. Vincent,' group religious worship constitutes
simple speech for constitutional purposes. Thus, governmental regulations that
attempt to proscribe the content of worship must be predicated upon state
interests sufficiently compelling to curtail free expression rights.'06 The same
constitutional tests the Court uses when analyzing secular speech therefore
pertain to regulations of "subversive" worship as well.
The free speech test that most logically would apply to subversive worship
is the "clear and present danger" standard, the Court's present seditious speech
103. See Boyan, supra note 73, at 487-88 (promoting adoption of institutional definition of religion
in addition to more individualistic or operational notion); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 80, at 537 (arguing
for consideration of associational and individual aspects of religious freedom).
104. See Garet, supra note 95, at 1012; Hall, supra note 89, at 122.
105. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
106. Id. at 269-70.
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test. Justice Holmes first articulated the test in Schenck v. United States, a
sedition case from World War I: "The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent."' 7 Since Schenck, the Court has
generally adhered to the "clear and present danger" standard and has focused
primarily on the test's proper application.'08 Although the standard has
changed over the years, 10 9 the current design of the "clear and present
danger" test tolerates mere advocacy of violence in the abstract. The
government may criminalize particular utterances only when it can prove both
that a speaker intended to incite "imminent lawless action" and that his or her
speech was likely to produce such a result."'
Applying the "clear and present danger" test to the Rahman prosecution
illustrates how the use of seditious speech tests to regulate "subversive"
religious sermons might operate in practice. According to the Supreme Court,
one must first classify the Sheik's sermonizing and counseling as conduct, not
belief."' The analysis then would switch from free exercise considerations
to the appropriate free expression test. Since delivering sermons or counseling
followers is not illegal per se, a content-based inquiry into the danger posed
by Rahman's words-most appropriately the "clear and present danger"
test-becomes necessary. Rahman definitely breached the "clear and present
danger" standard by instructing his impassioned followers to wage violent
jihad against the United States, because the plot uncovered by the FBI proved
that his statements created an imminent danger to the nation's security. Hence,
Rahman's conviction stands on solid First Amendment grounds." 2
While the charges against Rahman may not offend a simple reading of the
"clear and present danger" test, this prosecution nevertheless led the
107. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added).
108. Holmes first expressed his disapproval of the Court's application of his test in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority incorrectly applies clear
and present danger test to case with no showing of imminent threat to national security arising out of
defendant's speech). He repeated his criticism in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for upholding conviction without proof of immediate danger to
state).
109. See Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the
Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455-57 (1991).
110. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
324-26 (1957).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
112. The pretrial rulings in the Rahman case support a reading of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
that would allow the state to attack seditious religious speech using secular speech principles. In denying
Rahman's motion to dismiss his indictment because the charges involved the performance of his pastoral
functions, U.S. District Judge Michael Mukasey ruled: "[Tlhat speech-even speech that includes reference
to religion-may play a part in the commission of a crime does not insulate such crime from prosecution.
'[S]peech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself."' United
States v. Rahman, No. S3 93 Cr. 181, 1994 WL 388927, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1994) (denying motion
to dismiss) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir.
1970)).
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government into the uncharted territory of regulating the substance of particular
religious doctrines. Essentially, Rahman was prosecuted because the
government disapproved of one of the prominent teachings of radical Islamic
fundamentalism, namely jihad. The content of Rahman's beliefs drew the
government's attention; had he urged his followers merely to observe
Ramadan, he certainly would not have been subject to federal imprisonment.
While the Rahman prosecution may not have implicated "belief' in the internal
sense recognized by the Court, the state acted to suppress that religion by
criminalizing the expression of a faith's central tenet."t 3 To jail a cleric for
spreading a radical but central spiritual doctrine within a religious community
is effectively to outlaw the beliefs of that sect.
2. The Unprecedented Nature of Content-Based Regulations of
Religious Belief
Although the Court's individualistic definition of belief allows the
government to "censor" the doctrines of organized religions, the state has not
yet tested the scope of this power."' As the Rahman case illustrates-for
good or for bad-that history of restraint may now be at an end.
In the last century, the government has exhibited a remarkable reluctance
to regulate religious thought. While state activities in the past may have
indirectly hampered group religious beliefs," 5 the government has refrained
from targeting spiritual thoughts themselves. According to Professor Leo
Pfeffer, governmental actions against heretical or unorthodox religious
doctrines are essentially unheard of:
As far as is known, Congress has never enacted any law proscribing
or limiting religious unorthodoxy. Nor, with the exception of three
Bible belt anti-evolution statutes that quickly became dead-letter laws,
has any state apparently done so .... [T]here is no record after the
Revolutionary War and after the adoption of state constitutions having
bills of rights guaranteeing religious freedom of any person being
prosecuted for religious expression or worship deemed to be
113. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101. Of course, Rahman probably deserved such a penalty.
The danger created by Rahman's teachings likely left the government no choice but to put an end to them.
114. Congress's attack upon Mormonism in the nineteenth century represents one notable, though
dated, exception to this claim. In an effort to suppress the practice and doctrine of polygamy, Congress
revoked the corporate charter of the Mormon Church and confiscated much of its property. The Supreme
Court's opinion upholding this legislation is notable for the remarkable level of contempt that the Justices
displayed for the religious philosophy of the Mormons. See Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890). Since the Court decided the case well before it
developed the bulk of its free exercise jurisprudence or the "clear and present danger" standard, however,
the case is of limited usefulness for illuminating the modem shape of religious liberties. Nevertheless, the
case does illustrate the Supreme Court's willingness to characterize regulations attacking religious doctrines
as implicating conduct and not belief.
115. See, e.g., Edward Egan Smith, Note, The Criminalization of Belief. When Free Exercise Isn't.
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (1991) (describing effect of state law on Christian Science belief in faith healing).
1366 [Vol. 105: 1347
Jihad and the Constitution
unorthodox or heretical. Nor is there evidence of legislation toward
that end."
6
Furthermore, as Professor Tribe has noted, the government does not launch
frontal assaults on religious belief: "Short of government-mandated or state-
immunized brainwashing-whether called 'deprogramming' or given some
other name-the state does not directly attack citizens' religious beliefs.
Rather, the state rewards or punishes beliefs indirectly, by encouraging or
discouraging actions that are based on those beliefs."
' 7
In light of this background, the use of sedition charges against preachers
presents a truly novel situation for the nation's courts. Whereas in the past,
communism, syndicalism, and anarchism represented the ideological threats to
the government, today a new danger rooted in religion may be emerging. The
compelling state interest in preserving national security that the courts
recognized when siding against the free expression of subversive political ideas
earlier in the twentieth century now may resurface in the context of subversive
religious ideas. The combination of this compelling interest and the opening
provided by the individualistic definition of belief may place "radical" religious
beliefs squarely in the path of a government committed to defending itself.
Indeed, the Supreme Court probably has not anticipated how its treatment
of worship as speech may be used to suppress religious doctrines for national
security reasons. The Court has previously suggested that the government may
not "penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities;""' nor can the state assess the
validity of particular religious beliefs in its judicial proceedings.' 9 Moreover,
despite its individualistic bent, the Court has refrained from regulating the
content of religious ceremonies: "[I]t [is not] in the competence of courts under
our constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, classify, regulate, or in any
manner control sermons delivered at religious meetings."'' 0 This refusal to
monitor and control the content of religious sermons and ceremonies, however,
may be based upon the fact that the Court has never been presented with a
strong enough reason to do so. Religiously motivated terrorism could very well
become that reason.
116. Leo Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1131-32 (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
117. TRIBE, supra note 84, § 14-6, at 1184 (footnotes omitted).
118. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (citation omitted).
119. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
120. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (striking down conviction of Jehovah's Witness
for addressing religious meeting in local park).
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D. The Root of the Problem: An Inappropriate but Unalterable
Definition of Belief
Even though religious belief holds an unassailable position in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, the preceding discussion has demonstrated that the
individualistic definition of belief permits the state to regulate and thus
effectively "outlaw" the doctrines of organized religions. For the Court to
provide truly comprehensive protection to religious belief, this limited
definition of belief would have to be expanded to include communal
considerations. Although superficially appealing, such a solution to the threat
posed to organized religions by the "clear and present danger" test is both
unlikely and unwise.
One reason that the Court has refused to include communal elements in its
definition of belief-apart from its general bent towards liberal political
theory-is the rash of new exemptions from important governmental
regulations that such a redefinition would warrant. The Court presumably fears
that expanding the definition of belief to include more religious activities might
create a situation of liberty run amok: "The absolute protection afforded belief
by the First Amendment suggests that a court should be cautious in expanding
the scope of that protection since to do so might leave government powerless
to vindicate compelling state interests."1 21 If "belief' included group spiritual
activities such as worship or proselytizing, then a host of religious practices
might be exempted from important state regulations for the general health and
safety of the community.'22
In fact, the danger to national security posed by religiously motivated
terrorism represents the best argument against expanding the definition of
belief to provide absolute protection for group activities. As illustrated by the
treatment of peyote in the Smith case, 23 the Court seems particularly
reluctant to grant religious exemptions from neutral criminal laws. When the
force of the criminal law is combined with interests of national security-as
in terrorism prosecutions-the arguments for spiritual exemptions grow even
weaker. In a sense, this balancing of interests is only fair; it would be illogical,
unwise, and unjust for the system to jail an anarchist who advocates the
forceful overthrow of the government, but completely exempt from penalty a
121. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 n.7 (1978).
122. For example, although the Court recently has struck down a local ordinance discriminatorily
applied to eliminate the worship practice of animal sacrifice, it acknowledged that a narrower law applied
neutrally could be used to regulate such sacrifices for reasons of hygiene and public health. See Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2229-30 (1993). If the Court extended
absolute protection to all worship practices, the state would be powerless to regulate sacrifices in the
interests of public health.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
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cleric who utters the same idea couched in spiritual terms. 24 To grant a
religious exemption in the latter case would unduly intrude upon the state's
legitimate interest in self-preservation. As noted by Justice Reed in Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church: "Legislative power to
punish subversive action cannot be doubted. If such action should be actually
attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense."'
'12
Hence, the weight of practicality, rather than constitutionality, justifies
retaining a narrow definition of belief. This result, while utilitarian, still leaves
organized religions with a problem. The Court has acknowledged that the
absolute protection of belief is vital to the free exercise of religion, and clearly
"belief' involves both communal and personal elements. Yet the Court's
insistence upon a purely individualistic definition of belief allows the state to
regulate the doctrines of religious groups. Nevertheless, the Court's definition
will likely endure-and for good reason. Thus, while the Court's current free
exercise jurisprudence imperils the legitimate interests of organized faiths,
dramatically changing that jurisprudence could imperil the rest of society.
IV. PLACING LIMIrs ON THE GOVERNMENT'S POWER
The Supreme Court must allow the government to stop someone as
dangerous as Sheik Rahman. But what about less "subversive" preachers?
Under the "clear and present danger" test, the state possesses an expansive
power to regulate religious thought. As long as a jury can be convinced that
some religious idea-one that is more than likely foreign to them-poses a
danger to the nation, the government can suppress that belief. Unfortunately,
one cannot place much confidence in the ability of the courts-even when they
act in good faith-to confine the government's investigations to truly seditious
doctrines. Therefore, a limit must be placed upon this governmental power in
order to defend religious beliefs that may be different but not dangerous.
In attempting to find solutions to the constitutional problems posed by
counterterrorism, one should keep in mind the competing interests that must
be balanced. On the one hand, measures that unduly burden the state's ability
to address national security threats could have disastrous consequences. That
the target of a counterterrorism investigation or prosecution is a religious figure
should not significantly hamper the government's ability to take appropriate
measures to ensure the nation's safety. On the other hand, the present state of
the law gives the government enormous power to attack religious beliefs, a
power that could be misapplied to innocent believers. Therefore, the legal
context in which counterterrorism tactics operate should be fashioned to
124. The cleric may deserve some form of additional protection, but he or she should not be
completely immune from prosecution. See infra Part IV.
125. 344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952).
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guarantee that the state's devastatingly powerful tools are employed only
against those religious groups that truly threaten the nation. Crafting a religious
speech exception to the "clear and present danger" test would achieve this
result by requiring the state to prove the existence of an overt act undertaken
in furtherance of antigovemmental goals before the state can criminalize
religious beliefs.
A. Problems in Applying the "Clear and Present Danger" Test to
Religious Speech
Although the "clear and present danger" standard is the accepted
constitutional test for analyzing seditious speech, it is not an adequate check
on the government in religious sedition cases. No serious problem would arise
if the Court's individualistic definition of belief allowed the state to proscribe
dangerous religious beliefs and no others. Then the government could be
trusted-subject to judicial review of course-to combat only those ideas that
pose a "clear and present danger" to the nation. But due to the nature of
religious beliefs, neither courts nor prosecutors are well positioned to
determine which beliefs are truly "dangerous." Consequently, "innocent"
beliefs may be swept away in the national-security current. Furthermore, if
courts come to view houses of worship as locations that are "imminently
dangerous" per se, then applying the current "clear and present danger" test to
religious beliefs would risk the almost automatic proscription of certain
religious utterances.
1. Incompetence of Secular Courts to Interpret Religious Speech
The greatest problem with applying the "clear and present danger" test to
religious speech is the very operation of the imminent-lawlessness
standard. 26 The test allows the government to criminalize speech once it is
clear that the speech threatens imminent harm to the nation. 27 This
requirement, however, presupposes that in assessing the likely impact of the
targeted speech, courts can understand the speech's meaning. While the state
frequently and reasonably considers the meaning and validity of competing
ideas in the realm of secular speech, 28 it is far less competent to interpret
spiritual utterances.
The secular machinery of the state is simply ill-equipped to understand and
analyze religious speech. According to the Supreme Court, religious beliefs
126. See supra text accompanying note 110.
127. See Hentoff, supra note 109, at 1455 (stating that test requires harmful consequences of speech
to be "imminent" and "grave").
128. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
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involve matters of mystery, not legal fact."9 Hence, religious beliefs can "be
beyond the ken of mortals" to understand. 3' Secular courts' ignorance
renders them unable to evaluate scriptural evidence or to discern the meaning
of religious terms. 131 Consequently, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted almost 150 years ago, for secular tribunals to investigate certain "matters
of faith [or] doctrine" would be to "involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty
and doubt."'3 Roscoe Pound, sitting as a commissioner of the Nebraska
Supreme Court, acknowledged this judicial deficiency while analyzing the
evidence in a case involving an internal church dispute: "The books [about
canon law] in evidence, and the witnesses who testified with regard to them,
take many things for granted, of which the court is ignorant, and we should
feel greatly embarrassed were it necessary for us to attempt to construe
them."'133 After demonstrating the judiciary's institutional weakness in such
affairs, Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., issued his famous warning to courts
to avoid rushing into "the Dismal Swamp of obscure [religious] rules and
doctrines."'
134
Because courts realize their inability to weigh religious claims or to
analyze spiritual beliefs, they generally have refused to decide cases that would
require them to conduct extensive evaluations of religious doctrines. For
example, the Supreme Court has forbidden the judiciary from reviewing
internal, church doctrinal disputes: 35 "Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation."' 36 Similarly, juries may not determine whether religious
claims are fraudulent, 137 and courts will not recognize a cause of action for
clergy malpractice. '
38
129. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940), overruled on other grounds by
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (expanding scope of religious liberty
beyond that of Gobitis).
130. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) ("Religious experiences which are as real
as life to some may be incomprehensible to others .... T]hey may be beyond the ken of mortals .... ).
131. See, e.g., John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy
of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 869 (1984) (demonstrating difficulty courts could encounter in
ascertaining meaning of simple Jewish term "kosher").
132. German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, 291 (1846).
133. Bonacum v. Harrington, 91 N.W. 886, 887 (Neb. 1902).
134. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993,
1024 (1930); see also MILTON R. KoNVr-4 RELIGious LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 79 (1968) ("It is
impossible to see how American courts could possibly permit themselves to investigate theological
mysteries."); Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1328 (1980) ("Although civil courts have an
expertise in the tasks of interpreting documents and discovering the intentions of parties to contracts, that
expertise presumably does not extend to ecclesiastical matters.").
135. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (arguing that
courts must defer to highest ecclesiastical tribunals within church when resolving disputes over doctrine);
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871) (holding that courts cannot participate in internal
church debates over dogma).
136. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707. 716 (1981).
137. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
138. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) ('Indeed, a cause of action for clergy
malpractice has been rejected uniformly by the states that have considered it.... Mhis unanimity is based
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An inquiry regarding the "imminent danger" posed by violent religious
speech would lead courts at least as deep into the "Dismal Swamp" as would
the aforementioned activities for which courts consider themselves
incompetent. To determine if spiritual doctrines pose a "clear and present
danger" to the state, courts would have to undertake exhaustive investigations
into the meanings of particular religious beliefs, investigations that they are
plainly ill-equipped to conduct. The judiciary would be faced with difficult
question after difficult question, each requiring a specialized understanding of
imponderable religious beliefs, an expertise that secular courts clearly lack.
For example, in assessing whether the "clear and present danger" test
proscribes certain religious speech, courts first would have to determine
whether the speech calls for some concrete action, or whether it simply is
spiritual imagery. In other words, is the violence spoken about merely
symbolic, designed to add color to the religious experience? Or does the
doctrine genuinely call for war in terms cryptic to outsiders? The world's
religions are filled with violent imagery and symbolism.139 For instance, the
Old Testament contains the following passage: "God is a just judge, / And God
is angry with the wicked every day. / If he does not turn back, / He will
sharpen His sword; / He bends His bow and makes it ready. / He also prepares
for Himself instruments of death; / He makes His arrows into fiery shafts.'
140
This is precisely the type of metaphorical language that the judiciary is
incompetent to interpret. Is this passage a call for war against the unrighteous?
Or is it simply a graphic way to urge followers not to stray from the true path?
Courts assessing religious doctrines for seditious content must therefore
determine what place specific ideas have in a faith; congregants may
understand some violent religious utterances to be simple literary devices,
while they may regard others as advocating specific actions. Deciding into
which category a particular belief fits would require courts to conduct deep and
difficult inquiries into the targeted sect's theology.
Even if a court could conclude that a religious utterance is not merely
imagery but rather a call for harm to befall a target, it then would have to
determine the form that the religion believed the harm would take. Does the
doctrine call for violence or physical attack? Or does it merely promote
damnation, psychological injury, or even just bad luck? For example, the
Koran states: "0 Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and
press hard on them. Their abode is hell and an evil destination it is.' 14' A
court interpreting this verse delivered by a radical Islamic fundamentalist
on the difficulty that would be encountered in evaluating such a claim without entangling the civil courts
in extensive investigation and evaluation of religious tenets.").
139. See generally JAMES A. AHO, RELIGIOUS MYTHOLOGY AND THE ART OF vAR (1981) (surveying
violent images contained in world religions).
140. Psalms 7:11-13 (emphasis added).
141. Qur'an 9:73 (Muhammad Zafrulla Khan trans., 1970).
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would face the hard task of ascertaining the meaning of "press hard." Does the
doctrine urge a grisly death for all disbelievers, or does "press hard" simply
describe disbelievers' treatment in the afterlife? Even if a court concludes that
a religious group clearly wishes ill upon some target, ascertaining whether the
penalty encouraged by the faith represents a "clear and present danger" could
be extremely difficult.
Even if a court could establish that a belief is not merely imagery and that
it calls for actual violence, it then would have to divine who the
instrumentality of the violence was meant to be. Does the doctrine encourage
believers themselves to inflict harm upon the target, or will a deity perform the
deed, perhaps acting through angels or forces of nature? The Book of
Revelations, for example, includes this depiction of the final battle at the end
of the world: "And I saw the beast, the kings of the earth, and their armies,
gathered together to make war against Him who sat on the horse and against
His army."'142 Even if a court clearly understood that "Him who sat on the
horse" refers to some deity or force of good, what exactly is "His army?" If
a radical Christian group argued that the "army" soon would destroy all
nonbelievers, to whom would they believe "army" referred? Courts would have
to investigate the group's theology to decide whether individual believers or
heavenly forces are supposed to do the Lord's bidding. Simply because the
members of a religious group wish harm upon some target does not necessarily
mean that they themselves pose a danger to it.
Even if a court concludes that a religious belief is not merely imagery, that
it calls for actual violence, and that believers will execute the attack, the "clear
and present danger" test's imminence requirement would still remain to be
satisfied. That is, does the belief call for violence today or at some later date?
Suppose a survivalist religious doctrine advocated the murder of all infidels
when Armageddon arrives. To apply the "clear and present danger" test, courts
would be forced to examine survivalist dogma to determine when Armageddon
is supposed to come. Similarly, the Koran states:
We never punish a people until after We have sent a Messenger.
Before We decide to destroy a township, We command the affluent
section of its people to adopt the ways of righteousness, whereupon
they decide on disobedience. Thus the sentence becomes due against
it, and We destroy it utterly. 143
What if a radical Islamic terrorist group that encouraged violence raised as its
defense to a sedition charge that the harm it advocated certainly was not
142. Revelations 19:19.
143. Qur'an 17:15-16 (Muhammad Zafrulla Khan trans., 1970).
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imminent, since it never issued any warning?' 44 Courts then would have to
investigate Islamic theology to determine whether any of the group's utterances
could qualify as a warning, or whether the passage applied to terrorist activities
at all.
This cataloging of problematic judicial inquiries is by no means
exhaustive; courts undoubtedly would have to conduct a myriad of additional
investigations into religious beliefs when attempting to apply the "clear and
present danger" standard to abstract spiritual speech. Secular courts simply
have too many opportunities to reach incorrect conclusions about the religious
beliefs before them. Thus, the problem with the "clear and present danger" test
as applied to religious speech lies not so much in a bigoted FBI's targeting
minority faiths, but rather in a well-meaning but underqualified judiciary's
misconstruing and misinterpreting as violent what are actually peaceful
religious doctrines.
An example may illustrate this problem more fully. Violent religious
imagery fills the Judeo-Christian canon. 45 Since courts and juries are likely
to be well versed in the Judeo-Christian ethic, however, they probably would
understand that using such symbolism in a religious ceremony poses no real
danger to society. But what about unpopular or less familiar creeds? During
his struggle against colonial rule in India, Gandhi repeatedly likened the British
government to the Hindu figure Ravana, a monster possessing the attributes of
Satan. 146 Drawing upon the legend of Ravana and other Hindu texts, Gandhi
urged Hindus to participate in a struggle against the evil forces of the colonial
regime.' 47 The secular British government, unfamiliar with Hindu dogma and
frightened by a non-Christian faith, could easily have jumped to the conclusion
that Gandhi's language created a "clear and present danger" of "imminent"
violence. Of course, nothing would have been farther from the truth. In fact,
Gandhi argued that violence was the way of Satan and that to fight the British
through violent means would be to submit to the forces of the Devil.
143
Hence, secular courts cannot determine which religious beliefs in the
abstract pose a "clear and present danger" to society. Awe and mystery
surround religious doctrines; that the state could hope to understand and
classify them by their likely violent impact is overly optimistic.
144. In such an instance, this defense might be fallacious because the passage is written from the
standpoint of God and not Muslims in general. This interpretation of the passage, however, is itself
certainly open to debate.
145. For a discussion of the history of violent imagery in the Judeo-Christian tradition, see AHO. supra
note 139, at 80-100, 165-81, 194-217.
146. See William w. Emilsen, Wrestling the Serpent: Gandhi, Amritsar and the British Empire, 24
RELIGION 143, 147 (1994).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 149.
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2. The Problem of "Imminence Per Se"
Despite the Court's prioritizing of religious over secular beliefs, the "clear
and present danger" test may actually permit the government to proscribe
religious ideas more easily than secular ones. Because courts may regard
certain religious settings as dangerous by their very nature, the test might lead
them to criminalize "subversive" religious speech almost automatically.
In analyzing violent ideology, the Supreme Court has drawn a sharp
distinction between mere theoretical advocacy and actual incitement. As the
Court stated in Noto v. United States, "[T]he mere abstract teaching of
Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a
group for violent action and steeling it to such action."'' 49 Hence, the state
may not punish abstract advocacy of violence, but it may prohibit attempts to
incite people to undertake imminent lawless action. 150 For example, although
the government cannot close down a college seminar on violent Marxist
theory, it may prohibit a labor leader from urging a mob of angry anarchists
to burn down city hall.
Interestingly, while the imminent-lawlessness standard may protect violent
secular ideologies lodged in nonincendiary settings, it might permit the total
prohibition of certain religious utterances. People often express religious belief
most vibrantly through communal activity among a congregation of the
faithful.' 5 ' By definition, priestly sermons do not advocate ideas in the
abstract; rather, they are designed to compel followers to take certain moral
actions. Generally, a cleric disseminating a religious tenet to his or her
followers fully intends to induce them to abide by it. Moreover, congregants
do not listen to these teachings out of academic interest, but instead use them
to structure their lives. Viewed from the outside, religious services therefore
could appear to courts to be occasions for incitement delivered by an earnest
orator to a frenzied, impassioned throng. 52 From a structural perspective,
sermons and worship logically resemble the regulable incitement of the mob
of anarchists more than they do the nonregulable college seminar about
Marxism. Thus, courts applying the "clear and present danger" test might
construe almost all religious speech as per se imminently dangerous.
Consequently, because religious belief often finds expression in group
settings, the imminence requirement of the "clear and present danger" test
could lose its bite when applied to religious speech. Unlike secular thought,
149. 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
150. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
152. worshipers in some religions often work themselves into a frenzied passion. For a discussion of
religious enthusiasm in various Christian sects, see Douglas Davies, Christianity, in WORSHIP 35, 54-56
(Jean Holm & John Bowker eds., 1994).
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which can thrive in a nonincendiary setting such as the classroom, the state
almost always may be able to regulate group religious beliefs because they
frequently are lodged in inherently "imminently dangerous" settings. 53 Thus,
despite the Court's hierarchy favoring religious belief, the "clear and present
danger" test paradoxically may allow the state to proscribe spiritual ideas more
easily than it can censor secular thoughts.
B. Crafting a Religious Exception to the "Clear and Present Danger" Test
The conventional "clear and present danger" test is therefore an
inappropriate tool for evaluating "seditious" religious speech. Courts cannot
apply the standard accurately and the test may allow for the proscription of
religious speech too easily. Of course, many constitutional tests are imperfect.
In this instance, however, the impropriety of the "clear and present danger" test
is compounded by the fact that the utterances to which it would be applied are
effectively religious beliefs, which lie at the core of the Free Exercise Clause
and merit greater constitutional protection than do secular beliefs.
Unfortunately, according to the Supreme Court's definition of belief, once
expressed externally, even peaceful religious doctrines do not qualify for
absolute constitutional protection. Therefore, the best solution to this problem
may be to safeguard group religious beliefs through the "back door," by adding
an overt act requirement to the "clear and present danger" test as applied to
religious speech.
1. The Distinction Between Secular and Religious Overt
Act Requirements
Currently, the "clear and present danger" test contains no overt act
requirement.'54 Indeed, the seditious conspiracy law, the criminal statute that
the government will likely employ in future religiously motivated terrorism
prosecutions, does not require the state to prove that defendants committed any
specific acts in furtherance of their conspiracy. 55 From time to time,
153. Although the government may not criminalize teaching about violent religious creeds as an
academic subject, religious belief requires dissemination in a religious environment in order to serve its
purpose. Marxism need not lose its persuasive appeal when studied in a political theory class. In the
classroom, students can reach their own conclusions about the worth of Marxism and can decide whether
to order their political lives around its theory. Hence, political theory taught in the secular classroom does
not lose its political character. A comparative religion class, by contrast, might strip Islamic fundamentalist
ideas of their religious appeal. College classes would secularize the faith and turn it into nothing more than
sociology, thus performing none of the spiritual functions of religious beliefs.
154. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (upholding conviction for advocating
overthrow of government before any overt acts were undertaken in furtherance of goal).
155. See United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that seditious
conspiracy statute requires no overt act).
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Supreme Court Justices 5 6 and commentators 57 have argued for an overt
act requirement for the "clear and present danger" test in order to promote
vibrant political expression. The Court, however, has rejected their arguments,
asserting that the state should not be powerless to prevent crimes that are still
in their formative stages:
Obviously, ["clear and present danger"] cannot mean that before the
Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If
Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is
attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a
course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. '5
The Court's reluctance to add an overt act requirement to the "clear and
present danger" test may well be justifiable. Because the government can
understand the threat posed by secular ideas,'59 preventing the spread of
dangerous speech may be essential to national security. The Court's past
rejections of an overt act requirement, however, have occurred solely in the
context of secular speech. The actual criminalization of religious speech
through the use of the "clear and present danger" standard presents a novel
situation to the nation's courts. 61 In this uncharted territory, an overt act
requirement exclusively for religious utterances makes sense. Not only is the
government especially unable to understand religious speech, but also the
constitutional value implicated by religious sedition prosecutions-the
inviolability of religious belief-is of even greater importance than the sanctity
of the political beliefs targeted in secular sedition cases.
2. The Mechanics of an Overt Act Requirement for Religious Speech
The "clear and present danger" test therefore should be modified to require
an overt act before the state can criminalize a spiritual utterance. To jail a
cleric for preaching a seditious sermon, the state first should be obligated to
prove that the cleric's congregants took some identifiable action in reasonable
156. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 590-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment requires
overt act before speech can be criminalized).
157. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 91, 137 (1984) (arguing that standard should require "complicity" in illegal acts rather
than simple advocacy).
158. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
160. At times, the Court has alluded to the possibility of applying the "clear and present danger" test
to religious activities, but it never has fully applied the standard. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S.
583, 589-90 (1943) (denying that religious defendants posed "clear and present danger" to state); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940) (acknowledging that state can punish speech that causes "clear
and present danger" but denying that religious defendants uttered such speech).
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furtherance of the sedition. This requirement would prevent the state from
mistakenly censoring sermons that have no potential for causing it harm. The
overt act could take many forms, including a trip to "case" a target, the
purchase of weapons, or the construction of explosive devices.161 Whatever
the shape of the overt act, it need only be sufficient to confirm that certain
religious teachings were actually seditious.' 62 If no reasonable nexus between
the cleric's speech and the subversive acts of his or her followers exists-that
is, if the congregants acted irrationally after hearing a sermon-then this
standard would preclude prosecution of the preacher.
This proposal would require courts to make inquiries into religious belief
no deeper than the ones they already must conduct in most free exercise cases.
To apply the overt act requirement, courts might have to decide if particular
subversive speech is actually religious. But judges are accustomed to
determining whether a claimant has a character of religiosity, a relatively
neutral task. 63 Additionally, courts might have to screen out secular radicals
who cloak their sedition in religious terms. Otherwise, a group of violent
anarchists could seek enhanced constitutional protection by peppering their
seditious speech with references to Buddhism. Again, however, in the course
of deciding free exercise cases, courts have looked to objective criteria to
determine the sincerity of "religious" claims. Courts rely on these criteria to
avoid substantive inquiries into underlying religious beliefs.164 Thus, while
courts might have to ask tangential questions about religious beliefs when
deciding whether to apply the overt act requirement, these questions would not
require the comprehensive evaluations of spiritual matters that courts are
incompetent to undertake.1
65
161. Sheik Rahman's codefendants were arrested while mixing explosives for a bomb.
162. In this sense, the overt act requirement for religious sedition proposed by this Note would
function like the overt act traditionally required in conspiracy prosecutions. Because criminal agreements
can be difficult to pinpoint, the state often must prove the occurrence of an overt act as evidence that the
conspiracy actually exists. See United States v. Offutt, 127 F.2d 336, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (arguing that
overt act is a "manifestation that a conspiracy is at work"). Similarly, the overt act in the religious sedition
context would confirm the existence of "dangerous" beliefs.
163. Since most free exercise cases require a threshold determination of whether a claimant is
religious, courts have created neutral tests that help them make this decision without delving too deeply
into particular religious doctrines. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1036-37 (3d Cir. 1981)
(holding philosophy of MOVE organization did not amount to religion); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
213-14 (3d Cir. 1979) (determining that school course called "Science of Creative
Intelligences-Transcendental Meditation" involved religious instruction); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp.
1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (determining that plaintiff's preference for cat food did not amount to religious
creed).
164. These objective criteria to determine sincerity include inconsistent prior acts of the claimant, the
size and history of the religion, and the existence of evidence indicating the presence of material incentives
to fraudulently profess a belief. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430,
441 (2d Cir. 1981).
165. See Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (arguing that courts cannot evaluate
truthfulness of beliefs but can determine whether they are religious and whether they are sincerely held);
see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (noting that courts must weigh sincerity and
religiosity in deciding religious claims).
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In addition, the "reasonable nexus" standard under which this proposal
would operate might require some minor explorations of religious belief. In
order to protect clerics from lunatics who wrongly interpret their sermons to
justify violent acts, this Note suggests that for a prosecution to succeed a
reasonable relationship between the speech and the overt act must exist.166
Obviously, deciding that a follower irrationally interpreted a particular religious
doctrine would lead a court far beyond its realm of expertise. Much like the
inquiries into religious sincerity that courts presently conduct, however, this
reasonability determination could be made by looking to objective criteria. 67
To determine whether a violent follower acted under a reasonable interpretation
of a religious belief, courts could investigate the history of violence within the
sect, evidence of similar doctrinal interpretations by other followers, or the
existence of prior violent acts by the preacher in question.
Of course, adding an overt act requirement to the "clear and present
danger" test would tie a preacher's criminality to the bad acts of his or her
followers. The danger that a congregation of people schooled in the relevant
religious doctrines will misinterpret the preacher's words, however, is far less
than the danger of misinterpretation by an inept judiciary. Moreover, the "clear
and present danger" test already defines a speaker's crime partially by
reference to the audience's external circumstances: Spreading seditious
advocacy among a troop of Cub Scouts is surely not as serious a criminal act
as spreading it among a cell of revolutionary anarchists.
Nevertheless, this proposal may not be perfectly airtight. On rare
occasions, the overt act requirement might protect preachers who utter sedition
so clear that no court could misinterpret it, but whose followers commit no
overt acts. For example, a cleric could state: "I hereby do advocate and
encourage the overthrow of the U.S. government through the use of force."'
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The overwhelming need to provide some form of protection to group religious
beliefs, however, justifies a standard that occasionally might afford increased
safety to the "clearly" seditious cleric. In fact, in the secular realm, suppressing
"clear" seditious advocacy has not been very useful from a national security
perspective anyway.169 Moreover, the determination of whether certain
166. In most instances, the reasonability standard probably would be unnecessary because prosecutors
would be highly unlikely to bring sedition charges against clearly law-abiding preachers for the subversive
actions of their deranged followers.
167. Cf. Barber, 650 F2d at 441 (describing neutral criteria that can be utilized to determine religious
sincerity).
168. Of course, the speech in question would have to pass the court's threshold determination of
religiosity to obtain enhanced constitutional protection under this proposal. In the instance of "clear"
sedition unencumbered by spiritual trappings, such a determination might be a difficult hurdle to clear.
169. The twentieth-century experience with advocacy-based attempts at preventing subversive actions
has been less than encouraging. Although during World War I the government brought 2000 speech
prosecutions aimed at subversive defendants, see William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech. Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 245, 256 (1982), "'[nlot a single first-class German spy or revolutionary workingman
was caught and convicted of an overt act designed to give direct aid or comfort to the enemy,"' ZECHARIAH
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speech constitutes "clear" religious sedition might depend upon the particular
religious biases of individual courts. Thus, to exempt "clear" sedition from the
overt act requirement might link the outcome of a sedition charge to a judge's
own spiritual opinions.
3. The Advantages of an Overt Act Requirement for Religious Speech
The proposed overt act requirement for religious sedition cases would
improve the current law in several ways. First and most importantly, the
requirement would serve as an objective standard to assist the courts and the
state in making what would otherwise be a very subjective determination of
the imminence of harm posed by a particular religious belief. Secular tribunals'
incompetence in religious matters renders ascertaining the threat created by
spiritual doctrines difficult, if not impossible. The overt act requirement
represents a neat solution to this problem. Secular courts would no longer have
to inquire about the meaning or impact of particular religious beliefs; a
"dangerous" religious utterance simply would be one that led to an identifiable
overt act committed against the state. Innocent religions that may use violent
religious imagery in their worship but that do not oppose the state's authority
would thus be spared from criminal prosecution.
Second, the overt act requirement would preserve a realm in which
"violent" religious ideologies could exist in the abstract. Without the
requirement, courts might regard religious institutions as per se "imminently
dangerous" settings and hence permit the almost automatic criminalization of
all "subversive" religious beliefs uttered within them. The overt act
requirement would allow radical religious creeds to exist as doctrines much
like violent Marxism can exist in the college classroom. Only when a
congregant took action to further the violent teachings of a belief could the
state move to attack the doctrine in question.
Third, an overt act requirement also makes sense politically. The sedition
charges against Sheik Rahman produced fears in some parts of the U.S.
Muslim community that the government was placing Islam on trial. 170 Those
fears might have been even greater, however, if the FBI had not exposed a
massive terrorist plot on the verge of completion. As long as all religious
sedition prosecutions require an overt act, the government will be able to
identify to the public the actual subversive activities that it is attempting to
combat. Moreover, prosecutors could assure peaceful religious groups that the
government has neither the intention nor the power to criminalize their
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 513 (1946) (quoting Charles Beard). Similar
prosecutions in the 1950s and 1960s were equally unsuccessful. See Mayton, supra, at 256-57.
170. See Mae M. Cheng, Verdict Stirs Fears: Muslims in Queens Wary of Hysteria, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 2, 1995, at A14.
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religious beliefs. Thus, the requirement might make religious sedition
prosecutions less threatening to targeted spiritual communities.
Finally, the overt act requirement need not constrain the government's
ability to defend itself. Rather than closing down avenues of prosecution, the
requirement simply would help the state to identify those religions that truly
pose threats to national security. Furthermore, this requirement should not
unduly burden law enforcement. If the government can deploy sufficient
resources to infiltrate a church, record its doctrines, and try to interpret them,
detecting the existence of preparatory overt acts would not require much
additional effort.
The Rahman case demonstrates how little an overt act requirement would
constrain law enforcement in situations that do threaten national security. The
FBI broke up the Rahman plot after the defendants actually had begun to mix
the explosives to be used in the bombing-a sufficient overt act. Thus, the
existence of an overt act requirement still would have allowed the government
to break up the Rahman conspiracy.
A variety of complex factual situations may arise that will make difficult
the determination of whether an overt act occurred or whether a cleric should
be held accountable for his or her congregants' actions. But even if the overt
act requirement does not safeguard every "innocent" religious doctrine, it still
represents a vast improvement over the present state of the law. As it stands
now, preachers more innocent than Sheik Rahman may be thrown in jail for
uttering religious speech that led to no criminal activity but that an
underqualified judiciary misconstrued as posing a danger to the state. Simply
put, the potentially damaging effects of such prosecutions on the constitutional
freedom of religious belief are frightening.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court places a premium on safeguarding religious
belief, its individualistic definition of belief stops far short of providing a full
range of protection to spiritual thought. As a result, the doctrines and beliefs
of peaceful, organized religions stand open to regulation by the state when its
secular machinery judges them "subversive." Because this individualistic
definition is unlikely to change, "innocent" institutional religious beliefs should
be protected by modifying the mechanism by which they may be labeled
"dangerous." By adding an overt act requirement to the "clear and present
danger" test as applied to religious speech, courts can defend the interests of
organized religions without handcuffing the government in its efforts to address
genuine national security threats. Some action to defend institutional religious
interests is vital in the face of religiously motivated terrorism prosecutions;
otherwise, the harm inflicted upon religion by Middle Eastern governments
bent on combating violence could easily make its way to the United States.
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